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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
to such award.2 Although forced to admit that the award, in the
first instance, is based on the need for support during adminis-
tration, the court pointed out that, under the statute, the minimum
award was one thousand dollars and the personal representative
of a surviving spouse is authorized to make the selection in case
the spouse dies before payment.
VII. PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Five decisions of the Appellate Court of Illinois for the
First District, all involving the scope of judicial review in civil
service cases,' incorporate the only interesting developments in
this field for the past twelve months. The initial decision, typical
of the entire group, is that of Nolting v. Civil Service Commission
of the City of Chicago.2 Therein, the Civil Service Commission
discharged a police officer for abandoning his beat without per-
mission as well as various other infractions. The order of dis-
missal, reviewed by the circuit court under the rules of the
Administrative Review Act,3 was reversed and the officer ordered
reinstated by that court when it concluded that the commission's
decision was excessively severe in relation to the charges against
the officer. On appeal, however, the Appellate Court reversed the
judgment, holding that the trial court had gone beyond the
legitimate bounds of review. The so-called Civil Service Act
authorizes a discharge for "cause" but, as it fails to define that
term, it is deemed to be within the discretion of the commission
to determine whether the charges alleged and proved are suffi-
cient to warrant a dismissal. In reviewing decisions of this type
prior to the passage of the present Administrative Review Act,
the. courts adhered to the principle that the findings of the com-
mission as to the existence of "cause" would not be reversed
42 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§.330 and 333.
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 242, § 39 et seq.
2 7 111. App. (2d) 142, 129 N. E. (2d) 236 (1955).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 24 , § 77a provides that judicial review of final
administrative decisions under the civil service laws shall be governed by the
Administrative Review Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 264 et seq.
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unless they were unrelated to the requirements of the service
or so trivial as to be unreasonable. The result achieved followed
naturally since the court found nothing in the Administrative
Review Act which would justify an abandonment of this long-
standing limitation upon the scope of judicial review in such
cases.4 The court, following this basic theory, reached identical
conclusions in the other decisions of this series.
5
An additional problem worthy of mention was involved in
the last decision in this group, that of McCaff ery v. Civil Service
Board of the Chicago Park District." In reviewing the Civil
Service Board's order dismissing an officer, the trial court re-
manded the case to the former with instructions to eliminate
from the record all hearsay evidence and also permitting the
parties to submit additional evidence if they so desired. When
the case ultimately reached the Appellate Court, that tribunal
affirmed the action of the trial court despite the officer's conten-
tion that a trial de novo should have been held. The reviewing
court needed only to point out that the board was merely follow-
ing the orders of the trial court and that the latter had the
jurisdiction to enter such an order. The decision would appear
to be fundamentally correct inasmuch as the expensive trial
de novo can thereby be eliminated with prejudice to no one since
additional evidence may be offered.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Although there have been no decisions of far-reaching im-
portance during the past year, a number of cases have left their
mark upon the law of Illinois. In the case of Heimgaertner v.
Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Company7 for example, the
4 Iii. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 264 et seq.
5 McCaffery v. Civil Service Bd. of Chicago Park Dist., 7 Ill. App. (2d) 164, 129
N. E. (2d) 257 (1955) ; Watkins v. Civil Service Com'n of City of Chicago, 7 Ill.
App. (2d) 140, 129 N. E. (2d) 254 (1955) ; Martin v. Civil Service Com'n of City
of Chicago, 7 Ill. App. (2d) 128, 129 N. E. (2d) 248 (1955) ; Foreman v. Civil
Service Com'n of City of Chicago, 7 Ill. App. (2d) 122, 129 N. E. (2d) 245 (1955).
67 Ill. App. (2d) 164, 129 N. E. (2d) 257 (1955).
76 11. (2d) 152, 128 N. E. (2d) 691 (1955), noted in 34 CHWoAGo-KENT LAW
R rEw 254, 25 U. of Cin. I R. 111, 17 0. St. L. J. 146, and 13 Wash. & Lee L. R.
168.
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Supreme Court adhered to a position it had previously taken8
and again struck down the so-called "pay-while-voting" legisla-
tion.9 It might be noted that the attack was directed specifically
at the pay provisions, as opposed to the authorized absence pro-
visions, and the court concluded that the statute bore no substan-
tial relation to the object of public welfare to be attained as well
as creating a constitutionally improper classification. 10
To the surprise of practically no one,1 that portion of the
so-called Wrongful Death Act which prohibits Illinois courts from
entertaining wrongful death actions where the death occurred in
another state12 was held unconstitutional in Allendorf v. Elgin,
Joliet and Eastern Railway Company.3 This provision was said
to violate the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution.1 4 However, a contention that the entire "Wrongful
Death Act" must fail because a part of it was invalid was
rejected by the Supreme Court in the case of Myers v. Krajefska.5
Following established technique, the court concluded that the
remainder of the act was severable and might stand alone.
A rather interesting ramification of the problem of special
legislation was involved in the case of Pasfield v. Donovan."8
Therein, a statutory provision authorizing the court to award
attorney's fees to the successful plaintiff in an action to enforce
a zoning law17 was challenged on the ground that it amounted to
special legislation.' The court, however, thought otherwise and
8 See People v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 306 Il. 486, 138 N. E. 155 (1923).
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 46, § 17-15.
10 The court was of the opinion that, since only salaried persons and wage
earners were to be paid for time spent voting, the statute amounted to special
legislation in violation of Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 22.
11 The U. S. Supreme Court had heretofore held unconstitutional a Wisconsin
statute of essentially identical import. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609, 71 S. Ct.
980, 95 L. Ed. 1212 (1951).
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.
138 Ill. (2d) 164, 133 N. E. (2d) 288 (1956).
14 U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 1.
15 8 Ill. (2d) 322, 134 N. E. (2d) 277 (1956).
16 7 Ill. (2d) 563, 131 N. E. (2d) 504 (1956).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 73-9.
18 Special legislation is forbidden where a general law can be made applicable by
Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 22.
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treated the subject law as an additional sanction imposed against
violators rather than as a special privilege conferred on a
particular group.
Of significance to a large percentage of the public is the case
of People v. Reiner 9 wherein the Supreme Court upheld that
portion of the Driver's License Act which requires judges or
clerks of courts to report convictions for certain traffic offenses
to the Secretary of State." An attack charging that the act
violated the doctrine of separation of powers 21 in that it imposed
non-judicial duties on judicial officers was repulsed on the theory
that the constitution does not require complete separation and
this requirement does not unduly burden the judiciary. Also, of
general significance is the fact that the so-called Reapportionment
Act22 was, in the case of Donovan v. Holsman,23 held invulnerable
with respect to the senatorial districts therein created on the
ground that the constitution 24 requires only that area be the
prime consideration and not the sole consideration in creating
said districts.
Of passing interest is the case of People ex rel. Chicago
Dental Society v. A.A.A. Dental Laboratories, Inc., 25 wherein the
Supreme Court sustained the statutory regulations relating to
the practice of dentistry 26 which were challenged for a whole host
of reasons. The so-called Habitual Criminal Act 27 was likewise
upheld in the case of People v. Kukoch,28 in which it had been
assailed on the ground that it contained more than one subject.29
The potency of the police power to censor motion pictures on the
196 Ill. (2d) 337, 129 N. E. (2d) 159 (1955), noted in 1955 Il. L. Forum 767.
20 ll. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 95', § 73.32.
21 11. Const. 1870, Art. III.
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 46, § 158-1 et seq.
238 111. (2d) 87, 132 N. E. (2d) 501 (1956).
24 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, §§ 6, 7, and 8.
25 8 Il. (2d) 330, 134 N. E. (2d) 285 (1956).
26 In particular, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 91, § 60a.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 602.
28 7 111. (2d) 255, 130 N. E. (2d) 505 (1955).
29 111. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 13 provides that an act shall contain but one
subject.
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ground that they are immoral or obscene was confirmed by a
United States District Court in the case of Times Film Corpora-
tion v. City of Chicago.3 Therein, the court upheld the same
municipal ordinance3 1 that was heretofore under fire before the
Supreme Court of Illinois. 2
Although mentioned elsewhere in this survey, the cases of
Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v. Batdorf33 and Inter-
national College of Surgeons v. Brenza34 also possess constitu-
tional significance. In the former case, the Supreme Court upheld
the act limiting possibilities of reverter and rights of re-entry
to a duration of fifty years. 5 In the latter case, a legislative
attempt to exempt from taxation property used by societies for
philosophical purposes36 was held invalid by the Supreme Court.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
The most striking development in the law of municipal
corporations is contained in the unfortunate decision rendered
by the Appellate Court for the First District in the case of
Ward v. Village of Elmwood Park.7 It appearing that a zoning
ordinance might bar his intended use, the plaintiff therein filed
suit for a declaration of his right to use his property. The trial
court held this ordinance to be invalid and an amendatory ordi-
nance, passed while the suit was pending, to be inapplicable.
The Appellate Court, however, concluded that the plaintiff's
rights were to be determined according to the latter ordinance
and decided against him since its validity had not been chal-
lenged. The net result is to leave the landowner with a pre-
30139 F. Supp. 837 (1956).
31 Mun. Code Chicago 1939, Ch. 155, §§ 1 and 3.
32 American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. (2d) 334, 121 N. E.
(2d) 585 (1954). The case was remanded for further proceedings and has not
reappeared in the published reports so the final disposition thereof is unknown.
336 Ill. (2d) 486, 130 N. E. (2d) 111 (1955), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviEw 250, and 1956 Ii1. L. Forum 298. See also Section VI, Property, note 5.
34 8 I1. (2d) 141, 133 N. E. (2d) 269 (1956).
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, §§ 37b to 37h.
36 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 500(10).
378 Ill. App. (2d) 37, 130 N. E. (2d) 287 (1955), noted in 34 CHICAo-KENT
LAW REVIEW 261.
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carious decision to make. "Should he elect to make improve-
ments of a substantial nature so as to acquire a non-conforming
use, he risks having to remove them if the ordinance is subse-
quently upheld; should he, on the other hand, elect to forbear
from making such improvements in order to first exercise his
legal right to challenge the validity of the zoning ordinance, his
intended use may be barred by further action of the municipality
during the pendency of his suit, as in the instant case."3
Another case which has evoked editorial comment is that of
Slaton v. City of Chicago,39 wherein the Appellate Court for the
First District was called upon to interpret the statute imposing
liability on municipalities for injuries sustained as a result of
mob violence."° The defendant city was therein held liable for
injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by a mob when the court
construed the statute to create liability "where it is shown that
the unlawful crowd of people was assembled for the purpose
of carrying out what it believed was its collective or community
interest, and in the execution of that purpose took over the powers
lawfully delegated to and vested in the local authorities in order
to exercise such powers correctionally and summarily over the
plaintiff. ''4'
A somewhat unusual construction was placed upon the
statute giving municipalities the right to participate in the Illi-
nois Municipal Retirement Fund 2 by the Supreme Court in the
case of People ex rel. Schuwerk v. Illinois Municipal Retirement
Fund.43 Although the general rule would be that the power to
enact an ordinance includes the power to repeal, it was there
held that the power given the municipality was exhausted by a
single exercise and, once having elected to participate, the munici-
pality could not thereafter withdraw. The case seems significant
38 34 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVi W 261 at 263.
398 I1. App. (2d) 47, 130 N. E. (2d) 205 (1955), noted in 5 DePaul L. R. 312,
44 Il1. B. J. 780, and 54 Mich. L. R. 1184.
40 Il. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, §§ 512-7.
418 Ill. App. (2d) 47 at 59, 130 N. E. (2d) 205 at 210.
42 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, §§ 1175-1201.
486 nl. (2d) 405, 128 N. E. (2d) 923 (1955).
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in that the language used in the opinion appears to be broad
enough to include other legislation of this type. Another con-
struction problem of general interest was involved in the case of
People v. Herbster,44 a quo warranto proceeding to oust the
commissioners of a park district. The statute there pertinent
provided that the commissioners should hold office for a stated
term "or until their successors are elected and qualified. '45 For
some twenty years no elections were held and, for that matter,
very little else was done. The Appellate Court for the First
District, however, concluded that the carryover provision did not
entitle the commissioners to remain in office forever and that
their conduct amounted to an abandonment or implied resignation
from office.
Two other cases of some general significance might be noted
in passing. In the case of Humphrey Chevrolet, Inc. v. City of
Evanston,4 6 the Supreme Court held valid an ordinance of the
defendant city which prohibited commercial activity on Sunday
though excepting the sale of certain commodities from its opera-
tion. In the case of Lindburg v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the
City of Springfield,47 a zoning board of appeals had granted a
variation pursuant to a statute authorizing such action where
there are "practical difficulties or particular hardship [s]." 4' The
Supreme Court, however, held that findings couched in the gener-
alized statutory language were insufficient to support the action
and invalidated the variation.
TAXATION
The nebulous and ephemeral tax deed received a further set-
back at the hands of the Supreme Court, in the case of Pickens
v. Adams, 49 when that tribunal determined that the Reconveyance
447 Ill. App. (2d) 342, 129 N. E. (2d) 448 (1955).
45 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 105, § 2-10.
467 Il1. (2d) 402, 131 N. E. (2d) 70 (1956).
478 11. (2d) 254, 133 N. E. (2d) 266 (1956).
48 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 73-4.
497 Ill. (2d) 283, 131 N. E. (2d) 38 (1956), noted in 1956 Ill. L. Forum 309.
Hershey, C. J. wrote a dissenting opinion.
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Act 50 was applicable to tax deeds to separate mineral estates.
The statute in question provides in substance that unless the
grantee of a tax deed shall be in possession or occupation, or
institute proceedings to take possession within one year, the
owner of the real estate may effect a redemption of the property.
The majority of the court seemed almost oblivious to practical
realities respecting the difficulty of taking "possession" or main-
taining a suit to obtain possession of a mineral estate. These
difficulties were superficially overcome on the theory that such
grantee might somehow obtain constructive possession or might
institute a suit in ejectment. It would seem, however, that the
grantee would already have constructive possession and that an
action in ejectment would not lie inasmuch as no one would be
in actual possession of the property. The most that can be said
for the decision is that tax deeds to mineral estates are not
thereby afforded a better status than tax deeds to other estates.
Another case having considerable impact on the practical
aspects of tax collection is that of People ex rel. Callahan v.
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company.51 The case involved
objections made by the taxpayer on the ground that his property
had been assessed at the full cash value whereas other property
in the area had been assessed at a lesser figure. It will be recalled
that such a proceeding must be predicated on the doctrine of
constructive fraud and, to sustain this burden, the taxpayer had
alleged that its property was assessed at full value; that other
local property was assessed at a certain percentage thereof; that
the County Board of Review made no revisions; and that equali-
zation procedures resulted in a final assessment that still fell
short of full value by a stated percentage. The Supreme Court,
however, held that these allegations were insufficient to sustain
the theory of constructive fraud. What, exactly, the court would
expect of a taxpayer was left open, but it is difficult to imagine
what more he could do, at least short of alleging and proving the
50 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, §§ 736-8.
518 Ill. (2d) 66, 132 N. E. (2d) 544 (1956). Hershey, C. J. filed a dissenting
opinion.
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full cash value of every parcel of property on the assessment
rolls of the county. From a practical point of view, the result in
this case would seem to constitute a very serious limitation upon
the scope of judicial review of assessments.
The Supreme Court has also rendered several decisions
clarifying and limiting the Illinois policy relating to exemptions
of lodges, fraternal orders and similar societies and activities.
The most significant of these decisions is that of In re Estate of
Schurema 52 where it was held that bequests to a Masonic build-
ing corporation and a similar unincorporated association were
not charitable within the meaning of Section 28 of the Inheritance
Tax Act53 if the bequests were not expressly limited to use for
specified charitable purposes. Although the instant case appears
to be the first application of this doctrine to inheritance tax
problems, the court was able to justify its position by reference
to earlier decisions holding that real estate owned and managed
by Masonic groups is subject to real property taxes. However, it
may be noted that situations where the property is used solely
for public charity were distinguished.5 4
In the other decisions of this type, the court had before it
the question of exemption from real property taxes. In the case
of International College of Surgeons v. Brenza,55 the court denied
exemption to a not for profit corporation claiming to be a chari-
table or philosophical organization. In People v. Turnverein
Lincoln,56 the court likewise denied exemption to another not for
profit corporation with reference to real property used primarily
for classes in physical education. Similarly, in Rogers Park Post
No. 108 v. Brenza,57 the court denied exemption to the improved
real estate of an American Legion Post.
528 Ill. (2d) 125, 133 N. E. (2d) 7 (1956).
53 11. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 401.
54 281 Ill. 480, 117 N. E. 1060 (1917).
558 l1. (2d) 141, 133 N. E. (2d) 269 (1956).
568 I1. (2d) 198, 132 N. E. (2d) 499 (1956).
578 I1. (2d) 279, 133 N. E. (2d) 16 (1956).
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TRADE REGULATION
Almost sixty years ago, the Appellate Court for the First
District indicated, by way of dictum, that a trade mark could
not be conveyed in gross and might be transferred only with the
right to manufacture the product to which it was appurtenant.58
The apparent silence intervening since that decision has at last
been broken in Illinois by the case of Goodman v. Motor Products
Corporation.59 The same court there affirmed its earlier position
and promulgated a like rule with respect to trade names as well.
While recognizing that such intangibles may, for some purposes,
amount to property rights, the court, in both decisions, appears
to have been more strongly influenced by the deception which
could be practiced on the public if such transfers were tolerated.
VIII. TORTS
The outstanding decision in the law of torts, that of Nudd
v. Matsoukas,1 produced two changes of consequence in the law
of Illinois. In one count of the complaint, a child, through his
next friend, sought to hold his father and a third party liable
for injuries sustained in an automobile accident between cars
driven by the defendants. In a separate count, predicated on a
prior wrongful death law,2 the father was charged with causing
the death of the mother of the same child. With respect to the
first count mentioned, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier
position 3 and held that an unemancipated minor could maintain
an action in tort against his parent, at least where such action
was predicated upon the wilful and wanton misconduct of the
parent.4 In reaching that conclusion, the court acknowledged,
58 The Fair v. Jose Morales & Co., 82 Ill. App. 499 (1899).
599 Ill. App. (2d) 57, 132 N. E. (2d) 356 (1956).
1 7 I1. (2d) 608, 131 N. E. (2d) 525 (1956), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEw 333, 5 DePaul L. R. 302, 44 Ill. B. J. 840, and 42 Va. L. R. 687.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.
3 See Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor Bus Co., 310 11. 38, 141 N. E. 393,
390 A. L. R. 491 (1923).
4 This allegation may well have been otherwise necessary because of Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 95 , § 58a, which denies recovery by a guest passenger
against a host driver in simple negligence cases.
